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ABSTRACT: The continuous increase in marine traffic and the construction of several offshore 
installations has led to a serious concern regarding the risks to offshore platforms from ship collisions. 
The main aim of this study was to carry out a probabilistic collision-risk analysis for offshore 
platforms exposed to powered collisions with passing vessels using an automatic identification system 
(AIS) database. The paper first describes the statistical distribution of the ship traffic under study and 
then considers how this information can be effectively used to estimate collision frequencies and 
impact energies for various categories of vessel, based on a simple probabilistic method. The effects 
of various collision mitigation measures, such as the use of enhanced collision alarming devices and 
the ability of platforms to rotate using thrusters, are considered in the frequency calculations. The risk 
method presented in this paper can be applied in the design and development phase of both new and 
existing platforms. 
Keywords: Ship–platform collision, Probabilistic risk method, AIS database, Powered collision, 
Collision frequency.  
1. Introduction  
Over time, the ocean has become busy with various types of vessels and offshore platforms. To meet 
the continuous increase in the demand for hydrocarbons, exploration and drilling have increased, 
several offshore structures have been constructed, and new ships and shipping routes have been 
introduced. Because marine transportation remains the cheapest way to transport cargo, there is 
increasing concern about collisions between vessels and offshore structures. 
The risk of collision with offshore platforms is increased in areas of dense ship traffic, such as near 
coastal areas or naval bases. Effective planning of ship traffic is needed, along with more stringent 
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rules and regulations for marine activities around platforms, from the planning and exploration stages 
to the operational stage of platform deployment. 
 
Fig. 1. Ship and offshore platform collision accidents (a) Mumbai High North complex platform 
accident arising from attendant vessel collision (Daley, 2013); (b) capsize of a monopod platform 
after a collision in Madura Island, Indonesia (Widjaja et al., 2013); (c) passing vessel Marbella after 
collision with an accommodation platform (MAIB, 2003) (d) accident statistics based on vessel type.  
 
The ships that collide with offshore platforms can be generally classified as visiting vessels or passing 
vessels (Vinnem, 2007; Moan et al., 2002). The vessels that visit platforms, such as supply boats, 
service vessels, and shuttle tankers that routinely berth at the offshore facilities, contribute 
significantly to collision accidents. Fig. 1 (a) shows the total loss of the Mumbai High North complex 
platform in July 2005 after a collision with a multipurpose support vessel, and Fig. 1 (b) shows the 
capsize of a monopod platform after a boat collision. Passing vessels may also pose a serious threat, 
especially if the offshore facility is located within a frequently sailed route (see Fig. 1 (c)) (Paik and 
Thayamballi, 2007). Fig. 1 (d) shows the distribution of the types of vessel involved in collision 
accidents according to the Worldwide Offshore Accident Databank (WOAD), obtained from the 
International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (2010). It shows that nearly 23% of the total 
collision accidents involved a passing vessel. A study of the United Kingdom continental shelf 
(UKCS) found that passing-vessel collisions occur an average of once every 2 years (Oil & Gas UK, 
2010). 
The estimation of collision risk requires the quantification of credible collision frequency and 
associated consequences, which is integral to the safe design and robust building of a platform (Bai 
and Wei-Liang, 2015). DNV (2002) classified risk assessment techniques into qualitative, semi-
qualitative and quantitative techniques. Quantitative risk assessment (QRA) is considered to be the 
most sophisticated numerical technique that can provide useful guidance for predicting collision 
accidents, but it is associated with a large degree of uncertainty and requires expert judgement.  
Based on the extent of damage to the structures, a collision event can be categorised as minor or major 
collision. A minor collision is characterised by only repairable damage of the structure and probably 
will not call for cease of operation. On the other hand, a major collision will damage the platform 
globally and most certainly require a cease of operation. 
However, it seems extremely uneconomical to design a platform to withstand a major collision and 
remain operational. Therefore, in order to practically while at the same time economically solve the 
offshore collision problems the probability of major collisions should be kept at a low level by 
defining adequate preventive measure and minor ones should be considered in the design stage of the 
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platform. This is the design concept of offshore structures against collision adopted by many 
classification societies. 
   
Fig. 1. Ship and offshore platform collision accidents (a) Mumbai High North complex platform 
accident arising from attendant vessel collision (Daley, 2013); (b) capsize of a monopod platform 
after a collision in Madura Island, Indonesia (Widjaja et al., 2013); (c) passing vessel Marbella after 
collision with an accommodation platform (MAIB, 2003) (d) accident statistics based on vessel type.  
 
Most studies on the estimation of collision frequency have taken a scenario-based approach, which 
uses historical accident databases such as WOAD (DNV.GL). Extensive accident reports and 
statistical analyses are recorded for the UKCS by the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) (see 
DNV 2007a, 2007b; Robson (2003)). Muncer (2003) analysed accident statistics for floating 
production storage and offloading (FPSO) and floating storage unit (FSU) structures from 1996 to 
2002 and compared them with fixed installations in the UKCS area. The study revealed a 5% increase 
in the number of FPSO/FSU structures. The UK Offshore Operators Association (UKOOA) (2002) 
concluded that the collision probability for an FPSO subjected to passing traffic is increased due to 
the increased length of the FPSO, combined with a shuttle tanker, compared to fixed platforms. 
Furnes and Amdahl (1980) developed a drifting vessel collision-risk model for a shuttle tanker 
colliding with an offshore platform using Monte Carlo simulation techniques. 
Ship traffic databases are also used for estimating passing-vessel collisions. Automatic identification 
systems (AIS) are considered to be the most advanced and efficient tools for tracking vessel 
movements, providing up-to-date information on location, heading, course and other details of the 
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
4 
 
ship. Since 2002, IMO regulations have required new ships and all larger seagoing vessels (greater 
than 300 gross tons) and all passenger vessels to carry AIS on board (IMO, 2001). The AIS messages 
are transmitted from ship to ship and ship to port using very high frequency (VHF) radio wave signals 
in a limited geographical space (Eriksen et al., 2006). There are two methods by which AIS tracks 
ship movements: terrestrial and satellite. Terrestrial AIS is cheaper, but satellite AIS is more useful 
when a vessel is in open seas and out of range of the network of terrestrial AIS receivers. 
Most studies have used AIS marine traffic information to study ship-ship collision probability. 
Several researchers have used AIS information to analyse safety and the risk of ship collisions in busy 
sea areas such as the Singapore Strait (Qu et al., 2011), the Gulf of Finland (Goerlandt and Kujala, 
2011) and the Malacca Strait (Zaman et al., 2015). Xiao et al. (2015) analysed and compared AIS data 
for narrow and wide waterways. Zhang et al. (2016) proposed an advanced method to detect possible 
near-miss ship collisions using AIS data. All of these researchers studied ship-ship collisions; there 
have been very few studies of ship–platform collision frequency using AIS information (Haugen, 
1998). Recently Hassel et al. (2017) used AIS data to study change in passing vessel traffic pattern 
found before and after platforms were installed and concluded that the current risk assessment 
practices are overly conservative. 
Several commercial software programs are available for estimating collision risk, such as COLLIDE 
(Safetec), COLLRISK (Anatec UK Ltd.), Computerised Risk Assessment of Shipping Hazards 
(CRASH) (DNV), SOCRA (MARIN) and COLWT (GL). With the objective of harmonising various 
assumptions followed in the models, Safeship (2005) compared the models of MARIN, GL and DNV.  
The existing software is based on model assumptions; however, improvements taking into account the 
advanced technologies now in use and the stricter rules and regulations have not been made. For 
instance, Hassel et al. (2014) highlighted improvements required in the collision-risk model, which 
was introduced about 20 years ago for the Norwegian continental shelf (NCS), and noted that the 
ability of the platform to physically get out of the way of a vessel on a collision course was not 
considered and that there was also inaccurate modelling of the failure factors considered for both the 
ship and offshore platform. 
 Geijerstam and Svensson (2008) also reviewed various risk models and concluded that ship 
watchkeeping failure is the main factor in collision risk. Flohberger (2010) concluded that passing-
vessel accidents have not been reduced, despite the introduction of modern technology, because the 
majority of collisions reported are caused by watchkeeping failures. Upgrading collision-risk software 
to take account of technological advancements remains a major challenge. 
The main objective of this paper is to present a simple probabilistic collision-risk analysis method for 
offshore platforms subjected to a powered collision by a passing vessel, using a real ship traffic data. 
A detailed statistical assessment of a traffic database is presented and a simple probabilistic method is 
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used by following a real industrial procedure to estimate the collision frequency, considering various 
causal factors and the collision mitigation measures in place.  
A case study uses ship traffic data in the vicinity of the Busan coast. The database provides 
information regarding the general trends for the various types of ship traversing the sea, which in turn 
provides an estimation of all possible threats to the platform. Finally, collision frequency and the 
corresponding impact energy curves are derived for the various categories of vessel identified in the 
database.  
2. Collision risk assessment  
Offshore platforms located in heavy ship traffic regions demand a comprehensive quantitative 
collision-risk model. Fig. 2 shows the general procedure for performing a QRA of ship to offshore 
platform collision following IMO (2002). Although the concept of ‘risk’ is referred to in the paper, 
the current study mainly focuses on risk analysis, i.e., the quantification of collision frequency and 
impact energy, using marine traffic data to obtain a frequency vs. impact energy exccedance curve for 
each collision scenario (shown as red boxes in Fig. 2). 
Design Collision Loads
Identify credible of collisions
Identification of historical and facility data for a 
specified variable
• Striking ship(Powered vessel): displacement, speed, 
draught, ship type, bow shape, Collision angle, etc.
• Platforms: displacement, speed, draught, impact 
longitudinal location, etc.
• Marine traffic database
Selection of best fit of the PDF and Credible 
collision scenarios
• Goodness-of-fit technique 
• Probability graphical technique 
• Sampling technique 
Strain Energies (Dynamic Analysis) 
• Nonlinear Structural Analysis (FEA)
• Collision energy (Facility, colliding vessels)
Design Collision Loads
• Probabilistic exceedance curves 
(Collision frequency vs. impact energy)
Collision Frequency
• Powered vessel collision
• Drifting vessel collision
Impact Energies 
• Calculation of Kinetic energies (E) 
(Displacement, speed, hydrodynamic)
Define Accident Acceptance Criteria
Collision Consequences
• ETA and Fatalities
• PLL, IRPA
Detailed Assessment of Accident
• Collision Frequency
• Collision Consequences
Risk Criteria 
Satisfied?
Mitigation Option/control
• Establishment of safety zone around the platform
• Updating the installation information on nautical charts 
and publications
•Promulgation of the installed structure through maritime 
safety information
• Use of synchronized lights, different light characters 
and varied light ranges
•Installation of fog signals, etc.
Collision Risk Assessment
No
Yes
 
Fig. 2. Risk assessment flowchart for ship to offshore platform collision. 
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2.1 Collision description 
Fig. 3 depicts the major elements involved in ship to platform collision accidents. These include 
geographical location, type and age of the platform, density and mode of operation of the colliding 
ship; collision mitigation measures on platforms, such as an automatic radar plotting aid (ARPA), 
vessel traffic service (VTS) and standby vessel (SBV); external environmental conditions such as 
wind, wave, current, tide and visibility; and navigational control failures such as human error or 
mechanical or watchkeeping failure. These parameters are not always independent. For instance, a 
collision may be due to a communication error between the platform and the ship’s crew members 
and bad visibility leading to watchkeeping failure.  
The probability of collision from a ship-initiated recovery failure is higher than that of a platform-
initiated recovery failure, as ships are in dynamic motion, whilst platforms are either moored or fixed 
in place. Because the current study deals with collisions by passing vessels, the influence of external 
factors such as wind, wave, current and tide are not considered, and human factors or equipment 
failure are assumed to be the major causes of accident. However, bad visibility due to fog or heavy 
rain leading to watchkeeping failure is considered. 
 
 
Fig. 3. The main elements involved in a ship-platform collision. 
2.2 Hazard identification  
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Fig. 4 shows the risk analysis flowchart followed in the study. The initial stage of the risk assessment 
is the identification of all the credible types of rogue passing ship causing a threat to the platform. The 
degree of collision hazard depends mainly on traffic density, marine operations and the location of the 
facility. In general, marine traffic databases and historical databases are used to identify various 
hazards that could threaten a facility. To examine hazards, historical data are combined with an 
analytical model because historical data cannot always be used to predict future events. This is 
particularly true for passing-vessel collisions, because the traffic pattern varies from one location to 
another.  
 
Fig. 4. Risk analysis of ship–offshore platform collision. 
3. Probabilistic modelling 
3.1  Assumptions followed in the study 
The following main assumptions are followed in this paper:  
1. Offshore platforms considered in the study are assumed to be stationary, i.e. the position of the 
platform remains unaffected by mean wind, current and steady wave drift force. 
2. There has been an accident record on a collision between German submarine U27 and Oseberg B 
jacket platform in the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) (Vinnem, 2007) with a little damage 
was caused to the platform.  However, the probability of collision by this vessel type is generally 
negligible compared to other vessel types, considering their low frequency and the strict rules 
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and standards that govern their movement. Therefore, these vessels are typically excluded in the 
current study. 
3. Thrusters that are installed on installations having ship-shaped hull such as  tanker-converted 
FPSOs and floating liquefied natural gas (FLNG), can be used to rotate the platform when the 
incoming ships are in collision mode. In such cases, it is assumed that the thruster is 100% 
efficient in rotating the platform to prevent a head-on collision with the errant ship. 
4. Probability that the vessel on a collision course having powered collision with the platform 
depends upon the factor that the ship is unaware of the presence of the platform and there has 
been no or failure in recovery measures from either ship or platform side. 
3.2 Ship heading  
To determine the heading angle of an errant vessel colliding with a platform, the voyage segment that 
comes close to the platform is taken to be the representative heading for the whole ship course. Fig. 5 
illustrates this concept with a schematic diagram in which the ship traverses a 10-nm exclusion zone. 
Ship locations are marked as a series of points in the diagram, where θ represents the heading angle of 
the vessel close to the platform and A denotes the corresponding minimum distance to the platform.   
 
Fig. 5. Example of a ship’s voyage close to a platform. 
3.3 Collision diameter 
Collision diameters for ship-ship collisions have been discussed extensively in the literature (see 
MacDuff, 1974; Montewka et al., 2010; Fuji. et al., 1970). For offshore platforms, collision diameter 
is defined as the width of that part of the shipping lane cross-section from which the ship would hit 
the platform unless it changes course (CMPT [Centre for Marine and Petroleum Technology], 1999). 
Lat.
Offshore Platform
θ
Long.
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Thus, it represents the relative length of the vessel and platform in the event of a collision and directly 
depends on the route taken by the different vessels.  
 
Fig. 6. Collision geometry. 
Fig. 6 is a schematic diagram of collision geometry, in which the ships are on collision course with 
the platform. The apparent width of the platform represents the width of the platform in orientation 
with an incoming rogue ship (θ). For example, for a platform with a rectangular shape like 
semisubmersible, TLP, etc., the apparent width (WA) is given by 
𝑊𝐴 = 𝐿𝑝|𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜃| +  𝑊𝑃|𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃|,          (1)  
where Lp and Wp are the length and width of the platform, respectively. Considering that the ship route 
is distributed more or less uniformly around the platform and the errant ship collides at an arbitrary 
angle with the platform, the apparent width is calculated by assuming an average cross-sectional area 
of the platform. This is calculated by integrating the collision diameter by using Eq. (1) as follows: 
𝑊𝐴 =
2
𝜋
(𝐿𝑝 + 𝑊𝑝)          (2) 
Finally, the collision diameter (D) is given by 
𝐷 = 𝑊𝐴 + 𝐵           (3) 
3.4 Causation factors 
W
P Platform
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In this study, the following four main factors of a collision are identified and accounted for in the 
calculation of collision frequency. 
1. Probability of failure of pre-voyage planning (P1) 
2. Probability of failure of vessel-initiated recovery (P2) 
3. Probability of failure of platform-initiated recovery (P3)  
4. Probability of failure to fix navigational error (P4) 
The probability of failure of pre-voyage planning (P1) includes unawareness of the platform’s location. 
One of the main reasons is a lack of communication and awareness of the situation, because before 
exploration, drilling, or construction of the new platform, the information must be passed to the 
master of the ship and should be updated in nautical charts. It is assumed that the ship is 100% 
effective in amending its route, once it is aware of the platform’s presence. Therefore, only the ships 
that are unaware of the platform and have not planned to avoid it (P1) contribute to the collision 
probability.  
The main factor that determines the P1 value is the age of the platform. The P1 value is highest when a 
platform is new and ships are not yet informed of its location, which is estimated based on judgement. 
CMPT (1999) has formulated an empirical function for merchant vessels relating the age of a platform 
to the probability of a voyage plan. When the platform is new and ships are not yet aware of its 
location, the P1 value for merchant vessels is 95% and this drops exponentially with time to 12% after 
5 years. 
The P1 value also depends on the type of platform in operation and the type of passing vessel. The 
value for mobile platforms (such as jack up drilling platforms) is higher in comparison to fixed 
platforms because they are likely to be recently introduced and their location changes with time for 
exploration and other drilling operations. In addition, larger ships such as merchant ships with more 
sophisticated navigational aids and knowledge of offshore operations will be more effective at 
planning their voyages accurately and thus their P1 values are lower than those of smaller vessels such 
as fishing vessels. 
In this study, the values of P1 are the same as those in the front-end engineering design (FEED) 
method and are taken from Spouge (1991). Table 1 presents the values for new platforms (mobile 
platforms) and platforms that have been in place for a long time (fixed platforms). It can be seen that 
for merchant ships (1500 to 40,000 DWT), P1 = 0.95 for a new platform, i.e., 95% of ships are 
unaware of the platform’s location and therefore do not amend their route. As time passes, this 
reduces to P1 = 0.1 or 10% of ships, an order of magnitude less. Assuming that the platform has been 
in place for a long time, P1 values that correspond to fixed platforms are used in the study. The values 
chosen are of a magnitude less than those for a new platform, but this is justified because it is 
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expected that the platform locations will be well communicated in advance to passing ships, 
considering the drilling campaign preceding the installation of a platform. 
Modelling P1 does not consider the exclusion zone implemented to offer added protection to the 
platform, because this is expected to change the route of a ship’s voyage and should reduce the 
collision risk from these vessels. Therefore, the model effectively assumes that the risk due to ships 
planning to avoid the installation is zero, regardless of whether an exclusion zone is present, and only 
estimates the risk due to the vessels unaware of the platform (P1 fraction of vessels). 
The probability of vessel-initiated recovery (P2) represents an incoming errant ship under collision 
mode with the platform. The main factors contributing to this failure include human errors such as 
crew being absent, busy with other tasks, asleep, incapacitated by accident, under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs; bad visibility due to fog, rain, etc.; and errors resulting from radar or its operation 
(Tvedt, 2014). The effect of all these human errors in the P2 values is analysed using a fault tree 
combined with expert judgement (Geijerstam and Svensson, 2008).  
Table 1. Collision probabilities (CMPT, 1999). 
Vessel Type 
 
P1 
 
P2P3 P1P2P3 
Good 
Visibility 
Bad 
Visibility 
Good 
Visibility 
Bad 
Visibility 
Mobile Platforms           
Supply 0.1 7.6E-03 5.2E-02 7.6E-04 5.2E-03 
Standby 0.1 1.0E-02 8.2E-02 1.0E-03 8.2E-03 
Merchant 0–1500 DWT 0.95 1.3E-02 6.5E-02 1.2E-02 6.2E-02 
Merchant 1500–40,000 
DWT 0.95 9.1E-03 6.6E-02 8.6E-03 6.3E-02 
Merchant >40,000 DWT 0.95 4.8E-03 5.5E-02 4.6E-03 6.3E-02 
Fishing 0.5 2.6E-03 1.3E-02 1.3E-03 6.5E-03 
Fixed Platforms   
Supply 0.05 7.6E-03 5.2E-02 3.8E-04 2.6E-03 
Standby 0.05 1.0E-02 8.2E-02 5.0E-04 4.1E-03 
Merchant 0–1500 DWT 0.15 1.3E-02 6.5E-02 2.0E-03 9.8E-03 
Merchant 1500–40,000 
DWT 0.1 9.1E-03 6.6E-02 9.1E-04 6.6E-03 
Merchant >40,000 DWT 0.05 4.8E-03 5.4E-02 2.4E-04 2.7E-03 
Fishing 0.25 2.6E-03 1.3E-02 6.5E-04 3.3E-03 
 
The probability of failure of platform-initiated recovery (P3) represents the failure from the platform 
side to avert the vessel collision (for instance due to SBV or watchkeeping failures). Because of the 
short time available in which to react, the low speed of SBVs and difficulty in communicating with 
incoming ships, this type of recovery is difficult. 
Table 1 presents the P2 and P3 values obtained for the different vessel categories. The combined 
values of P2 and P3 are given instead of individual values because they are dependent. In other words, 
the success of platform-initiated recovery depends upon the ship’s watchkeeping and on the prevailing 
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visibility conditions, which are obtained from ocean meteorology data. To calculate the overall 
combined result for P2P3, each mode of failure needs to be accounted for with an event tree method. 
For example, CMPT (1999) presents one of the event trees used in the CRASH method to calculate a 
P2P3 value for the special case of supply vessels in good visibility. From that example, it is clear that 
P3 = 1 for most watchkeeping failures, that is, platform-initiated recovery is ineffective in 100% of 
cases. The mode of failure with the largest probability value is due to the crew being asleep (= 6.5 × 
10
-3
), and this dominates the overall result (7.6 × 10
-3
). In bad visibility, ineffective radar is considered 
to be the dominant factor. For a merchant vessel of 1500 to 41,000 DWT in bad visibility, P2P3 = 9.1 
× 10
-2
, i.e., the probability increases by an order of magnitude. 
The probability of ship crew members being unable to react in time to fix the navigational error (P4) is 
mainly dependent on the distance between the platform and the position of the ship at the time of 
navigational failure (A). MARIN provides different empirical relations for the estimation of P3 in 
terms of the distance between the platform and the position of the ship (Ellis et al., 2008). As a 
conservative approach, P4 = exp (−0.2A
1.5
) is used in the current study along with other causation 
factors. 
3.5 Collision mitigation measures 
To reduce risk to an acceptable level, priority should be given to reducing the frequency of events 
leading to a collision accident rather than its consequences. This consists of mitigation measures on 
the platform as well as the ship side. An extensive study on the decision making process for collision 
avoidance can be found in the literatures for ship-ship collisions. For instance, Line of Sight 
Counteraction Navigation (LOSCAN) algorithm developed by Wilson et al. (2003), neurofuzzy 
predictor modelling for ship obstacle avoidance by Harris et al. (1999). Zhao et al. (1994) and Zhao 
(1996) studied mariners behaviour and psychology in the decision making process using fuzzy sets. 
Oil & Gas UK (2010) guidelines include contingency plans and collision avoidance measures for 
ship-installation collision. They also discusses the efficiency of various collision detection systems. 
The existence of the platform should be communicated to the ship’s operator in advance of its voyage. 
NORSOK (2001) describes general risk preparedness and guidelines for all accidental events related 
to offshore structures. The HSE (2000) considers different passing-vessel collision scenarios based on 
ship traffic density, weather, visibility and vessel speed. UKOOA (2002) suggests collision preventive 
measures such as enhanced detection systems and rotation of the platform (with thrusters) to reduce 
collision damage to FPSOs. Based on a study conducted by Kenny (1988), the following two factors 
are considered in the present study: 
1. Use of enhanced collision alarming technologies such as ARPA, VTS, and a radar early 
warning system (REWS) (M1). Fig. 7 presents the combined effect of the introduction of these 
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technologies on the overall reduction of estimated collision probability, taken from CMPT 
(1999). Factors for ARPA located on SBVs and for VTS are similar, with VTS offering the 
best reduction with a mean value of 0.87, i.e., 87% of collisions averted. Thus, a multiplier of 
1–0.87 = 0.13 times the overall passing ship collision probability is used in this study. 
2. The ability of the platform such as turret-moored FPSO and FLNG, to rotate using its 
thrusters (M2). Doing this minimises exposed areas of the vessel by avoiding sideways-on 
collision by orienting the platform in the direction of an incoming ship on a collision course. 
This action will only result in reducing damage incurred on a platform presenting its width, 
by reducing the collision diameter. However, it is assumed here that heading control is 
possible under all weather conditions using thrusters, and the efficiency and number of 
thrusters in use are not considered. For the platform considered in the study, a collision 
reduction factor (Fd) of 0.28 can be achieved and for other platforms that cannot rotate to 
significantly reduce their exposure, this value becomes unity. 
The combined effect of the two mitigating factors considered above leads to a reduction in 
collision probabilities of 0.13 × 0.28 = 3.6 × 10
-2
, that is, a reduction of about two orders of 
magnitude. 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Effects of collision mitigation measures (reproduced from CMPT (1999)). 
3.6 Collision probability 
The probability of an incoming ship on collision course depends not only on the deviation of the 
ship’s route from its original path but also deviation of the ship’s heading. Fig. 8 illustrates the 
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lateral distribution of ship traffic (normal distribution) across a shipping lane. To account for the 
uncertainties arising from the randomness of ship traffic distribution across each route, we use the 
probability distribution to study their characteristics (Hughes et al., 2010). 
 
Fig. 8. Lateral distribution of ship traffic across a shipping lane. 
Considering the dynamic nature of the traffic distribution and the fact that vessels most often try to 
avoid a collision, Bai and Wei-Liang (2015) found that a skewed distribution is normally observed 
rather than a normal distribution. To calculate the probability distribution of vessels in each vessel 
route (Ptraff), because the collision diameter is small compared to the lane width (2𝜎), we assume a 
normal distribution across the shipping lane and its width is defined as +/− one standard deviation 
(CMPT, 1999). In other words, the width of the shipping lane contains 68.2% of the traffic within the 
lane. The deviation of a ship’s course varies independently from the ship’s offset from the platform. 
From AIS data, for each identified route, course deviation is obtained by the difference of heading and 
course of each voyage. A Gaussian distribution is usually assumed to find the probability of course 
deviation (Pdev) (Ellis et al., 2008). The actual probability of a vessel being in collision mode (Fd) is 
then given by the product of Ptraff and Pdev. 
The proportion of the vessels that are in the shipping lane directed towards the platform (Ptraff) is thus 
given by 
𝑃𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓 = 𝐷 × 𝑓(𝐴)           (4) 
where D,  P(A) and A denote the collision diameter, probability density at the centre of the platform 
and distance from the platform to the lane centreline closest point of approach, respectively. 
The probability distribution of normal distribution, f (A), is given by 
Ship traffic density acros
s shipping lane (N)
Offshore platform
Probability of ship on colli
sion course (Ptraff)
Shipping Lane width
(2σ)
Collision diameter
(D)
Distance to center line (A
)
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𝑓(𝐴) =
1
√2𝜋𝜎
𝑒𝑥𝑝 −
𝑘2
2
          (5) 
where 𝜎 is the standard deviation of the traffic distribution and k = A/ 𝜎 is the number of standard 
deviations that the platform is from the lane centreline.  
3.7 Collision frequency 
The frequency of ships passing in the near vicinity of the platform is analysed, and the probability of a 
rogue ship in collision mode is identified and calculated using probabilistic methods. Based on the 
number of vessels, the probability of collisions by each vessel and causation factors, the frequency of 
passing-vessel collision (F) is calculated using the equation 
𝐹 = 𝑁 × 𝐹𝑑 × 𝑃1 × 𝑃2 × 𝑃3 × 𝑃4 × 𝑀1 ×  𝑀2        (6) 
where N is the density of ship traffic in the shipping lane per year. 
3.8 Uncertainties 
a. The P1 values used were derived from data dating back to the 1990s. However, improved chart 
updating and the advanced communication methods currently available have probably led to a 
reduction of actual P1 factors. Considering current advances in communication and the fact that 
extensive drilling activities will take place prior to installation of the platform, the study used 
least conservative or minimum P1 values. 
b.  The P2P3 values considered in the study are subject to uncertainty because a variety of 
recommended methods give differing results.  
c. The mitigating effect of ship detection technologies such as ARPA and VTS was taken into 
account, based on estimated factors provided in CMPT (1999). Based on that information, an 
average collision reduction factor of 0.87 for VTS was chosen, which is based on expert 
estimates rather than actual historical data. In addition, the effectiveness of the collision 
avoidance measures depends on several factors that are difficult to quantify accurately and that 
need to be considered using a detailed fault tree approach.  
d. Passing ships modify their journeys in response to a new facility, leading to a reduction in 
collision frequency. Estimation of this reduction is subject to some uncertainty, considering that 
the ship route is dynamic and there has been continuous improvement in navigational safety 
through improved technologies, navigation standards and marine operations. The method used in 
this study was the standard approach (as set out in CMPT (1999)). 
e. This study has assumed that heading control against an errant ship coming on a collision course 
is possible via FLNG thrusters, under all weather conditions, thereby allowing the thrusters to 
minimise the impact probability by aligning head-on to any incoming collision threat from 
passing vessels. 
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4. Collision impact energy  
A collision event can be divided into external dynamics and internal mechanics (Pill and Tabri, 2011; 
Zhang, 1999). External impact energy influences the time-dependent rigid-body motion of the ship 
and the associated hydrodynamic effects (Paik and Thayamballi, 2003). Since Minorsky (1958), a 
number of studies have estimated collision impact energy and associated damage to offshore 
structures (see DNV, 2010; NORSOK, 2004). Table 2 shows the representative collision energies for 
powered passing vessels given by CMPT (1999). When considering the impact energies of passing 
vessels, the size distribution and the velocity of the ships in the shipping lanes are used to calculate 
the associated collision energy based on the typical distribution of the velocities presented in Table 2. 
The velocity of the ship at the time of collision is assumed to be constant and the same as the normal 
operating velocity of the vessel. This is justified by the fact that during powered vessel collision, the 
navigator is completely unaware of the presence of the platform. 
Table 2. Velocity and impact energy for different sized vessels. 
 Vessel size (tons) Vessel speed (knots) Impact energy (MJ) 
1000 11.1 18 
2200 11.6 43 
6500 13.2 165 
18,000 15.3 612 
100,000 15.3 3400 
 
Internal mechanics determine the local and global damage of the offshore platform by absorbing part 
of the kinetic energy in the form of strain energy. The collision impact load is estimated by either 
simplified analytical modelling with single-DOF (degree of freedom), multi-DOF modelling using 
FEA software, or by experiment. 
A passing vessel can either result in a drifting or powered collision with a platform. Drifting collision 
is generally characterised by low-energy impact (Jin et al., 2005; Zhang et al., 2015), whilst powered 
collision results in high-energy impact, causing serious damage to the platform (Hong et al., 2009; 
Storheim and Amdahl, 2014). The accuracy of the damage estimation on the platform and the 
colliding ship depends upon how well the interaction of external and internal energies are coupled 
(Travanca and Hao, 2015, 2014; Yu et al., 2016). 
5. Application 
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The ship traffic database forms the basis for probabilistic modelling of a ship’s collision with a 
platform. It not only provides the longitudinal and latitudinal positions of all vessels but also includes 
maritime mobile service identity number (MMSI), vessel type, vessel dimensions, cruising speed, 
heading and course. 
Fig. 9 shows the geographical region over which the ship movements are measured, with red marks 
indicating the position of a ship recorded at every instant. The database is defined over a rectangular 
area coordinate with latitude from 35° 12′ 00.66″ N to 34° 56′ 48.79″ N and longitude from 129° 00′ 
49.76″ E to 129° 17′ 14.82″ E shore (approximately 13 nautical mile radius from the coast). Vessel 
locations are traced approximately every 5 seconds, with 1,885,716 AIS-terrestrial ship positions and 
30 AIS-satellite ship positions and the corresponding summer DWT, heading, course and cruising 
speed of the vessel recorded. The database contains vessel movements from 17/03/2014 to 17/06/2014 
with records of 1,885,716 AIS-terrestrial and 40 AIS-satellite positions. The entire database contains 
close to 4,800 unique voyages.  
 
Fig. 9. Ship traffic based on database measurements. Ship positions are indicated in red. 
Because the Busan coast is one of the busiest ports in the world, with dense ship movements 
throughout the year, we obtained a very complex pattern of ship movements and so the collision risk 
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was expected to be high. A detailed study of the database revealed that the majority of vessels are 
more or less evenly distributed over the measured region, with thick traffic density observed near the 
port. For the current study, it is hypothetically assumed that a Prelude FLNG offshore platform with 
dimensions of 486 m × 74 m is located at (129.1859lat. 35.03016long.), with an exclusion region of 
10 nautical mile diameter defined around the platform, see Fig. 9. Therefore, for this study, the 
collision diameter calculated using Eq. (2) and Eq. (3) is 390 m. 
5.1 Analysis of ship traffic database 
A detailed analysis of the different types of ship observed in the database revealed 39 vessels and 
4847 appearances. The database is dominated by merchant vessels such as cargo, tanker and 
passenger vessels, with significantly more cargo vessels than other vessels (approximately 3.5 times 
more than the next most common i.e., tanker vessels). Further details of the database are given in 
Table A.1. The vessels are categorised into four major groups – supply, standby, merchant and fishing 
– according to the potential consequences associated with them. Unknown, unspecified and naval 
vessels, and other structures such as buoys are neglected in the further study. A 10 nautical mile 
radius of exclusion is generally defined for ships passing a platform (Lloyd’s Register, 2014). A total 
of 3725 ships passed within the exclusion zone.  
Table 3. Breakdown of merchant ship types by DWT. 
 
 
 
 DWT (tons) 
Ship type <1500 1500–40,000 >40,000 Total 
Cargo 155 1283 276 1714 
Cargo: Hazard A (Major) 0 99 81 180 
Cargo: Hazard B 0 3 6 9 
Cargo: Hazard C (Minor) 0 6 10 16 
Cargo: Hazard D (Recognisable) 0 12 30 42 
Passenger 8 15 10 33 
Tanker 56 283 38 377 
Tanker: Hazard A (Major) 1 54 6 61 
Tanker: Hazard B 5 72 2 79 
Tanker: Hazard C (Minor) 2 13 1 16 
Tanker: Hazard D (Recognisable) 0 18 0 18 
Grand total 227 1858 460 2545 
% 8.92 73.01 18.07 100 
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Table 3 illustrates the breakdown of different types of merchant ship based on DWT. It can be seen 
that 73% of all vessels fall within the range 1500 to 40,000 DWT, with significant contributions from 
cargo ships. Also, it is notable that the total number of merchant ships recorded is 2545, which is less 
than number of merchant vessels mentioned in Table A.1, because not all DWT information is 
available in the database. Hence, only vessels whose DWT is included in the database are considered 
further in our analysis. 
Table 4 shows the classification of fishing vessels. Almost 50% of the fishing vessels identified in the 
database do not give information on DWT, possibly because most of the fishing vessels have not 
upgraded their details with the AIS database.  
 
Table 4. Breakdown of fishing vessels by DWT. 
 
 
Fig. 10 illustrates the breakdown of ship traffic for supply, standby, merchant and fishing vessels 
based on DWT and ship type. As expected, cargo vessels in the merchant category dominate the 
database with a large number of vessels falling within 1500 and 40,000 DWT. This distribution is 
then applied equally to all shipping lanes.  
DWT Fishing Pleasure Craft Grand total % 
<1000 73 7 80 57.55 
1000–5000 43 5 48 34.53 
>5000 7 4 11 7.91 
Total 123 16 139 100 
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Fig. 10. Overall distribution of ship traffic within 10 nm exclusion zone 
5.2 Identification of major shipping lanes 
AIS provides details like geographic location, course and heading on average every 2 to 3 seconds for 
each ship voyage. Based on the closest-point approach method (Mou et al., 2010), the normalised 
heading distribution (i.e., those in the range 180° to 360° have been rotated by 180°) for all the 
voyages identified in the database 10 nautical mile around the platform are plotted, see Fig. 11. From 
the graph, it can be seen that most vessels (more than 60%) fall within a heading range of 20° to 60°. 
All heading angles are measured with respect to the global coordinate system. 
8.00%
0.30%
7.10%
61.60%
16.60%
4.00% 2.00% 0.40%
Supply Standby Merchant 0-1500dwt
Merchant 1500-40000dwt Merchant > 40000dwt Fishing 0-1000dwt
Fishing 1000- 5000dwt Fishing >5000dwt
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Fig. 11. Normalised headings of the voyage segments. 
To identify the major shipping lanes, voyages with similar heading angle are grouped into Routes A, B, 
C, D, E and F, assuming average heading angles for each of the route bandings.  
 
Fig. 12. Schematic plot of the main shipping routes identified around the platform location. 
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5.3 Displacement of the ship 
To calculate the impact energy, it is necessary to know the displacement of the passing vessel 
accurately. The database contains information about ship weights given in terms of DWT (cargo 
carrying capacity). Based on discussion with ship masters and the shipping industry, the mass of cargo 
and bulk carrier ships is in the range of 20% to 25% of the cargo carrying capacity of the ship. In 
other words, to carry a cargo weight of 40,000 DWT, the mass of a ship will be 8,000 to 10,000 tons. 
A conservative upper limit of 10,000 tons displacement is chosen. Thus, the displacement of the ship 
is its physical mass plus cargo weight, that is, 50,000 tons. The assumption that ships are filled with 
their maximum cargo carrying capacity may be slightly conservative, but this can be justified by the 
fact that the ship must take on ballast water to ensure that its propeller remains submerged even when 
it is not carrying cargo or other loads. For supply, standby and fishing vessels, the approximate 
relations of displacement given in BS 6349 (1994) are used, which are derived from block coefficients.  
Table 5. Breakdown of database by ship type and physical mass. 
Ship category 
 
Displacement (tons) 
1000 2200 6500 18,000 100,000 Total 
Supply 67 1 3 1 0 72 
Standby 2 2 2 0 0 6 
Fishing  63 31 34 10 1 139 
Merchant 0–1500 DWT 90 137 0 0 0 227 
Merchant 1500–40,000 DWT 0 60 701 569 528 1858 
Merchant >40,000 DWT 0 0 0 0 460 460 
Total 2762 
 
 
Table 5 shows the vessels in the database grouped by vessel size. The total number of vessels is 2762, 
which is slightly lower than the total in Table 2, because the vessels in the database that have 
unknown DWT values are discarded.  
6. Results and discussion 
Fig. 13 shows the probability distribution of course deviation for the six major routes identified in the 
database. The course deviations are plotted between −90 and 90 degrees, with the assumption that the 
ships will not sail in the opposite direction. The maximum value of standard deviation is 14.60 
degrees for Route A. This falls within the 15 degrees assumed by MARIN in the estimation of course 
deviation (Ellis et al., 2008). Table 6 summarises the heading range of each route banding and its 
properties. Among the different routes identified, Route C is the most densely populated. From the 
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collision probability (Fd) estimated for each shipping route, it can be found that the maximum 
collision probability is for route D. This is due to the higher probability of ship traffic and course 
deviation in Route B. Fig. 12 is a schematic plot of all the ship routes showing their position and 
orientation, centred on the platform.  
Table 6. Route bandings and their properties. 
Route 
Heading 
Range 
Average 
Heading 
Number 
in Route A (nm) σ (nm) Ptraff Pdev Fd 
A 0°–14° 7° 151 -2.51 3.03 0.019 0.012 0.0002 
B 15°–34° 24° 773 -2.55 2.77 0.012 0.035 0.0007 
C 35°–56° 45° 1422 -2.04 2.59 0.024 0.023 0.0005 
D 57°– 80° 68° 516 -1.67 2.53 0.027 0.036 0.001 
E 81°–160° 120° 777 -1.73 2.72 0.025 0.028 0.0007 
F 161°–180° 170° 86 -1.5 2.19 0.030 0.010 0.0003 
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Fig. 13. Probabilistic distribution of ship course deviation for different routes. 
 
6.1 Calculation of collision frequency 
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Based on Eq. (6), Table 8 lists the estimated collision frequency for the different identified routes and 
ship categories. Amongst the routes identified, Route F has a lower collision frequency, but a higher 
collision probability value, because the number of vessels in this shipping lane is lower compared to 
other routes. As expected, the maximum frequency of collision is for route C. Table 7 presents a 
summary of the overall frequency of collision of different ship categories obtained from all the routes. 
Merchant vessels of 1500 to 40,000 DWT exhibit a maximum frequency of 1.70E
−04
 per year. This 
constitutes almost 90% of the total collision frequency of other vessels. For the initial design stage of 
platforms, CMPT (1999) classifies the collision frequencies (per year) into high (>10
−2
), medium 
(10
−2
 to 10
−4
) and low (<10
−4
). Based on this classification, the overall predicted collision frequency 
value is 1.9E
−04
, which falls within the medium category of collision frequency. 
Table 7. Overall passing-vessel collision frequencies. 
All Routes Mitigation factor 
Frequency 
(per annum) 
Supply 3.6E-02 2.13E-06 
Standby 3.6E-02 3.16E-07 
Merchant 0–1500 DWT 3.6E-02 2.51E-06 
Merchant 1500–40,000 DWT 3.6E-02 1.70E-04 
Merchant >40,000 DWT 3.6E-02 8.42E-06 
Fishing  3.6E-02 4.19E-06 
Total   1.88E-04 
 
 
Table 8. Collision frequencies for different routes. 
 
Route  Ship category 
Number 
of vessels  Fd  Causation factor 
Mitigation 
factor  
Frequency 
(per year) 
 
   (N)   P1P2P3 P4  (M)  
 
Supply 12.0 0.0002 3.80E-04 0.451 3.60E-02 7.2E-08 
 
Standby 0.5 0.0002 5.00E-04 0.443 3.60E-02 1.1E-08 
 
Merchant 0–1500 DWT 11.5 0.0002 2.00E-04 0.558 3.60E-02 8.5E-08 
A 
Merchant 1500–40,000 
DWT 94.7 0.0002 9.10E-04 0.649 
3.60E-02 
5.7E-06 
 
Merchant > 40,000 DWT 23.5 0.0002 2.40E-04 0.634 3.60E-02 2.8E-07 
 
Fishing  8.8 0.0002 6.50E-04 0.693 3.60E-02 1.4E-07 
 
Total 151         6.3E-06 
 
Supply 61.2 0.0007 3.80E-04 0.451 3.60E-02 3.7E-07 
 
Standby 2.5 0.0007 5.00E-04 0.443 3.60E-02 5.5E-08 
 
Merchant 0–1500DWT 59.1 0.0007 2.00E-04 0.558 3.60E-02 4.4E-07 
B 
Merchant 1500–40,000 
DWT 484.8 0.0007 9.10E-04 0.649 
3.60E-02 
3.0E-05 
 
Merchant >40,000 DWT 120.2 0.0007 2.40E-04 0.634 3.60E-02 1.5E-06 
 
Fishing  45.3 0.0007 6.50E-04 0.693 3.60E-02 7.3E-07 
 
Total 773         3.3E-05 
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Supply 112.6 0.0006 3.80E-04 0.451 3.60E-02 8.2E-07 
 
Standby 4.6 0.0006 5.00E-04 0.443 3.60E-02 1.2E-07 
 
Merchant 0–1500 DWT 108.7 0.0006 2.00E-04 0.558 3.60E-02 9.6E-07 
C 
Merchant 1500–40,000 
DWT 891.8 0.0006 9.10E-04 0.649 
3.60E-02 
6.5E-05 
 
Merchant >40,000 DWT 221.1 0.0006 2.40E-04 0.634 3.60E-02 3.2E-06 
 
Fishing  83.3 0.0006 6.50E-04 0.693 3.60E-02 1.6E-06 
 
Total 1422         7.2E-05 
 
Supply 40.9 0.0010 3.80E-04 0.451 3.60E-02 3.3E-07 
 
Standby 1.7 0.0010 5.00E-04 0.443 3.60E-02 4.9E-08 
 
Merchant 0–1500 DWT 39.5 0.0010 2.00E-04 0.558 3.60E-02 3.9E-07 
D 
Merchant 1500–40,000 
DWT 323.6 0.0010 9.10E-04 0.649 
3.60E-02 
2.7E-05 
 
Merchant >40,000 DWT 80.2 0.0010 2.40E-04 0.634 3.60E-02 1.3E-06 
 
Fishing  30.2 0.0010 6.50E-04 0.693 3.60E-02 6.6E-07 
 
Total 516         2.9E-05 
 
Supply 61.5 0.0007 3.80E-04 0.451 3.60E-02 4.7E-07 
 
Standby 2.5 0.0007 5.00E-04 0.443 3.60E-02 7.0E-08 
 
Merchant 0–1500 DWT 59.4 0.0007 2.00E-04 0.558 3.60E-02 5.6E-07 
E 
Merchant 1500–40000 
DWT 487.3 0.0007 9.10E-04 0.649 
3.60E-02 
3.8E-05 
 
Merchant >40,000 DWT 120.8 0.0007 2.40E-04 0.634 3.60E-02 1.9E-06 
 
Fishing  45.5 0.0007 6.50E-04 0.693 3.60E-02 9.3E-07 
 
Total 777         4.2E-05 
 
Supply 6.8 0.0003 3.80E-04 0.451 3.60E-02 6.3E-08 
 
Standby 0.3 0.0003 5.00E-04 0.443 3.60E-02 9.4E-09 
 
Merchant 0–1500 DWT 6.6 0.0003 2.00E-04 0.558 3.60E-02 7.4E-08 
F 
Merchant 1500–40,000 
DWT 53.9 0.0003 9.10E-04 0.649 
3.60E-02 
5.0E-06 
 
Merchant >40,000 DWT 13.4 0.0003 2.40E-04 0.634 3.60E-02 2.5E-07 
 
Fishing  5.0 0.0003 6.50E-04 0.693 3.60E-02 1.2E-07 
 
Total 86         5.6E-06 
 
 
6.2 Frequency vs. energy plot 
For each passing vessel, the impact energy is determined by combining the values presented in Table 
2 and Table 5. Table 9 lists the overall frequency of all categories of ship identified and their 
corresponding collision impact energies for five categories of collisions.  
 
Table 9. Frequency and impact energy by ship weight for all categories of collision. 
Ship weight (tons) 
Energy (MJ) 
 
Frequency (per 
annum) 
Cumulative frequency (per 
annum) 
1000 18 4.98E-06 1.88E-04 
2200 43 8.07E-06 1.83E-04 
6500 165 6.53E-05 1.74E-04 
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18,000 612 5.24E-05 1.09E-04 
100,000 3400 5.68E-05 5.68E-05 
Total 
 
1.88E-04 
 
 
 
Fig. 14 displays annual collision frequencies and their corresponding impact energies for each 
category of vessel. In all cases, the energies quoted are the kinetic energies of the incoming ship. 
 
Fig. 14. Frequency vs. impact energy curves for all impact energies categories. 
 
It can be seen that large and medium-sized merchant vessels contribute the largest risk to the platform 
as a result of their combination of large mass, higher cruising velocity and the large number of 
appearances within the database.  
 Further, the offshore platforms are designed such that it cannot withstand severe collisions involving 
higher level of impact energy, particularly for the three energy categories (165MJ, 612MJ and 
3400MJ) mentioned in the table 2. Therefore, to study the effect of lower impact energy collision, the 
two less severe categories of impact energies are considered separately. The collision impact energies 
corresponding to different categories of ships are estimated by quadratic interpolation and the 
corresponding frequencies are calculated by following the same method as discussed before. The 
consequences of collisions in low energy collisions are calculated in terms of energy absorbed by the 
platform, assuming that a 32% of the impact energy is absorbed by the platform during the collision. 
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This value is taken from the reference CMPT (1999) based on the experience from the highest impact 
energy value measured in a supply vessel collision with a semi-submersible in the UK sector. Fig.15 
shows the cumulative frequency and their corresponding absorbed energy for different categories of 
vessel. Since the merchant vessels with displacements greater than 40000 dwt are always associated 
with more severe collision, it is not included here. Although the absorbed energy considered in the 
analysis is greater than the design value of 4MJ (Lloyds Register), the maximum collision frequency 
(3.9 × 10
−5
 per year) for overall vessel category is found to be acceptable within the design criteria of 
10
-4
 annual probability of occurrence. Also, the overall collision frequencies are still dominated by the 
contribution of the merchant vessel with 1500-40000 dwt, as the vessel traffic region considered in 
the present study is dominated by the merchant vessels.  
 
Fig. 15. Frequency vs. absorbed energy curves for lower impact energies categories. 
 
6.3 Comparison of the result with previous studies 
Collision accident statistics are generally used to validate collision frequencies obtained in studies. 
These values are quite uncertain because only a few accidents are included in the database. OGP 
(2010) summarises accident and collision events, including near-miss statistics for the UKCS and 
worldwide from 1980 to 2005. The worldwide passing-vessel collision frequencies from 1980 to 1989 
and 1990 to 2002 were found to be 5.9 × 10
−4
 and 2.5 × 10
−4
 per year, respectively, which clearly 
shows a significant reduction. Because the predicted frequency is strongly location dependent, the 
typical values are impossible to present because they are largely determined by the characteristics of 
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the shipping lane and its distance from the platform. Also, great uncertainties exist among the 
software programs that are used in the estimation of collision frequency. Moan et al. (2002) provided 
an extensive review of risk assessments of FPSO collision involving supply ships, shuttle tankers and 
passing vessels in the North Sea and Gulf of Mexico and concluded that collisions from passing 
vessels depend on the location of the FPSO and the annual impact probability, which varies from 10
−3
 
to 10
−6 
or less. CRASH gave an average collision frequency value of 8.7 × 10
−3
 per platform year for 
the fixed platforms in the UK and Irish Sectors in 1990. CMPT (1999) estimated average passing-
vessel collision frequencies for fixed platforms to be 1.2 × 10
−3
 and 3.8 × 10
−4
 per platform year from 
1970 to 1992 for the UK and worldwide, respectively. For individual platforms, the collision 
frequency varied from below 10
−7
 per year to as high as 0.12 per year. Therefore, we may conclude 
that the collision frequency of passing vessels is strongly location specific and time dependent. The 
overall collision frequency obtained in the study (1.9E
−04
 per year) seems to be reasonably acceptable, 
considering the dense ship traffic in the studied area.  
7. Conclusions 
Offshore platforms installed in high-density ship traffic areas are prone to a high risk of collision by 
passing ships. This study describes a simple probabilistic approach to risk analysis for powered ship 
collisions with offshore platforms, using a marine traffic database. The primary focus of the study was 
to estimate the collision frequency from AIS data for different categories of vessel identified in the 
database, accounting for various collision mitigating factors such as enhanced ship detecting systems 
and the ability of platforms to rotate against the collision impact. In this context, AIS data available 
around the Busan coast was investigated to describe the proposed model. Amongst the various classes 
of vessel observed, large merchant vessels, in particular, cargo vessels of 1500 to 40,000 DWT 
possess a high risk of collision with platforms because of their large mass, higher cruising velocity 
and frequent appearance in the database, along with busy marine trade activities in this particular 
region.  
The proposed method considers various factors such as the distribution of vessel traffic, changes of 
shipping lanes with time and the efficiency of thrusters to rotate the platform in time before a collision 
occurs. This model can be effectively used in the industry during the initial design and operation 
stages of risk assessment. From AIS information, it is relatively easier to understand how platforms 
affect shipping routes and how collisions vary with time. Future research in this area includes the 
estimation of collision consequences in terms of loss of life and damage to the platforms and the 
environment. 
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Appendix A. Ship traffic data 
Table A.1. Vessel traffic recorded in the database 
Sl. 
No. 
Ship type 
Total 
unique 
voyages 
Sl. 
no. 
Ship type 
Total 
unique 
voyages 
1 Antipollution 6 21 Passenger 52 
2 Beacon, Port Hand 1 22 Pilot Vessel 6 
3 Cardinal Mark N 1 23 Pleasure Craft 92 
4 Cargo 2149 24 Port Tender 13 
5 Cargo-Hazard A (Major) 194 25 Reserved 18 
6 Cargo-Hazard B 14 26 Sailing Vessel 8 
7 Cargo-Hazard C (Minor) 22 27 SAR 6 
8 Cargo-Hazard D (Recognisable) 45 28 SAR Aircraft 5 
9 Dredger 11 29 Special Craft 1 
10 Dive Vessel 1 30 Starboard Handmark 1 
11 Fishing 230 31 Tanker 613 
12 High Speed Craft 17 32 Tanker: Hazard A (Major) 74 
13 Isolated Danger 1 33 Tanker: Hazard B 100 
14 Law Enforcement 27 34 Tanker: Hazard C (Minor) 19 
15 Light Vessel 1 35 Tanker: Hazard D (Recognisable) 27 
16 Local Vessel 2 36 Tug 311 
17 Military OPS 4 37 Unknown 152 
18 Navigational Aid 6 38 Unspecified 487 
19 Null 38 39 Wing In Grnd. 12 
20 Other 80 
 
Total 4847 
 
 
 
